In just over two months, US president-elect Donald Trump will take the reins of the world’s preeminent economic and military power, stepping into a role marked by escalating geopolitical rivalries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
Meanwhile, as the president-elect’s team gears up for the transition and finalizes cabinet picks, the world braces for a “MAGA 2.0” era of expanded tariffs and transactional diplomacy.
For Cambodia, a second Trump presidency could mean limited US focus on democratic reforms and human rights abuses, with pragmatic engagement likely centered on countering Chinese influence – echoing his first term’s “America First” policies, analysts said.
On top of that, with the US as Cambodia’s number one market for its cash cow garment and textile exports – a sector deeply tied to Chinese inputs – a new tariff regime hostile to China-linked supply chains and trade surpluses spells trouble for Cambodia’s dollarized economy.
Although, appointing an interventionist Secretary of State and targeting a potential national security threat in Cambodia could signal a break from Trump’s isolationist tendencies.
“Under Trump’s second administration, it is likely we’ll see a continuation of his pragmatic, sovereignty-focused approach rather than a major pivot,” said Sophal Ear, a Cambodian-American political scientist and associated professor at the Thunderbird School of Global Management, commenting on the future trajectory of US foreign policy in Cambodia post-Biden.
Trump’s foreign policy, which has historically emphasized non-interventionism and transactional deals, is expected to continue prioritizing economic and security concerns over interposing democratic values, according to Ear.
While Cambodia is strategically important within the US-China rivalry, this approach will likely persist, with the Trump administration focusing on bilateral trade and security interests rather than pressing Cambodia on human rights or political reforms, he said.
“It’s going to be the friend of my enemy is my enemy: Cambodia being close to China taints Cambodia in Trump’s eyes.”
In its first term, the Trump White House’s relations with Phnom Penh were marked by a mix of hands-off moments and punitive actions, but still underpinned by an ethos of strategic detachment.
At the height of his presidency, the US cut more than $8 million in aid to Cambodia and imposed visa bans, citing concerns over democratic backsliding during the 2018 Senate elections, which saw a crackdown on dissidents and opposition parties to the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
“These setbacks compelled the United States to review its assistance to Cambodia to ensure that American taxpayer funds are not being used to support anti-democratic behavior,” said a White House statement at the time.
The fund reductions mostly curtailed programs that supported the Cambodian military, local government authorities and a major taxation body.
In 2023, the Biden administration also announced a suspension of $18 million in aid to Cambodia as a response to the country’s presidential election, citing it as neither “free nor fair.” However, the decision was quickly reversed a few months later.
Comparatively, Trump’s comeback term could bring expanded aid cuts or more sanctions on Cambodian elites linked to human rights abuses, especially if such actions align with US security interests or respond to domestic pressure over high-profile cases.
“Still, these actions would likely be symbolic rather than a broader campaign to support civil society or democracy in Cambodia,” said Ear.
Sok Eysan, a spokesperson for the CPP, showed ambivalence when asked about potential aid cuts during Trump’s second term.
“It’s the right of donors to decide whether or not to provide assistance, and Cambodia respects that right. If the Trump administration does provide aid, we would welcome and appreciate it. However, if not, Cambodia will not be disappointed,” he said.
Chhan Sokunthea, the executive director of the Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM), warned that cuts to US aid focused on democracy and human rights could significantly impact Cambodia’s civil society sector, where most organizations rely heavily on international donors to fund their initiatives. She highlighted how the financial strain could particularly affect independent media in Cambodia, which plays a vital role in public service.
Amid this backdrop of diplomatic indifference, uncertain aid and shifting foreign policy, Cambodia faces a possibly growing challenge for its relations with a Trump-led US on another front: the rise of transnational cybercrime.
Despite strained aid relations, Washington has funneled $1 billion to Cambodia over the past 25 years, even as an industrial-scale cyber scam industry has emerged throughout the country and region, defrauding Americans of hundreds of millions annually. The incoming U.S. president may designate Cambodia’s organized cybercrime sector – a $12.5 billion industry linked to forced labor involving 100,000 people, according to the UN – a national security threat. Such a move could sour US-Cambodia ties, widen sanctions on Cambodian elites, and deal a sharp economic blow.
“The Trump administration may indeed frame Cambodia’s role in the cyber scam industry as a national security threat, particularly given the direct harm to American citizens and businesses,” Ear suggested, adding that Trump has historically taken a strong stance on issues directly affecting Americans’ financial interests and security.
If the next administration were to designate Southeast Asia’s scam rings a national security threat, it could trigger a global offensive and diplomatic tensions, as seen earlier this year when the US State Department under President Biden sanctioned Cambodian tycoon and CPP senator Ly Yong Phat over alleged ties to online scam centers, a move the Cambodian government called “unjust,” “unfair,” and “baseless.”
However, American federal institutions such as the US Institute of Peace have prioritized collaboration in intelligence gathering while strengthening the law enforcement and government capacities of Southeast Asian nations to combat the scamming industry.
Additionally, Trump pegged Senator Marco Rubio, a key supporter of the Cambodian Democracy and Human Rights Act, as his Secretary of State. The Act, which seeks to impose sanctions on Cambodian officials and tycoons linked to human rights abuses and corruption, has yet to pass through Congress.
Rubio’s advocacy for the bill suggests he may push to keep human rights issues on the US agenda, though his efforts could face challenges amid Trump’s security-driven foreign policy, noted Ear.
Beyond an indeterminate sanctions regime, Trump’s 2024 campaign was colored with economic nationalism, shaking the global tree with his rhetoric on higher tariffs.
“Trump’s tariff plans reflect an ill-informed mercantilist view of the world, which has been thoroughly discredited for more than two centuries,” said Stephen Higgins, a managing partner at Mekong Strategic Capital, a leading investment and advisory firm in Phnom Penh.
During his campaign trail, the president-elect pledged to slap 60 percent tariffs on all goods coming in from China and 10-20 percent tariffs on imports from all other countries.
Such proposals led researchers at Oxford Economics, a leading economic advisory firm, to estimate that the proposed tariffs could result in a 3% drop in exports from “non-China Asia,” with more vulnerable Southeast Asian economies likely facing steeper declines.
“The tariff plan, and Trump’s economic policies in general, are expected to lower global growth, and increase in inflation. Cambodia is not going to be immune from that, particularly given it has a dollarized economy,” said Higgins.
While regional neighbors like Vietnam – targeted by the Trump administration for currency manipulation late in his first term – are more likely to face the wrath of a White House frustrated by large trade surpluses, Cambodia could still be in the crosshairs.
“Trump doesn’t like any country to have a trade surplus with the US, and if I was Vietnam, I’d be getting very worried about now. […] Cambodia also has a trade surplus with the US, and Trump isn’t going to like that,” Higgins asserted.
Another to-be-determined trade agreement is the potential renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a tariff reduction program for developing countries which expired the month before President Biden took office and has not been renewed since.
While some local analysts think Trump may resume the GSP to Cambodia’s benefit, it is worth noting that Cambodia’s eligibility was already under review before the 2020 expiration. This followed concerns from US senators, including Trump ally Ted Cruz, over Cambodia’s poor labor and human rights record. The GSP review coincided with the EU’s decision to partially withdraw Cambodia’s Everything But Arms trade privileges, citing similar human rights issues.
Trade disparities aside, supply chains heavily reliant on Chinese inputs and with limited value-added production in Cambodia may be another flashpoint.
“The US approach to rules of origin, and their antipathy towards China, could really impact Cambodia’s garment sector, given so much of the raw material comes from China,” Higgins said.
Even so, in a region and world where harmonic diplomacy between the US and China is the political trend, Cambodia is expected to drift closer to the latter.
The Hun Manet administration will likely view Trump’s presidency as an opportunity to continue its pragmatic foreign policy, relying on China for development while carefully managing its US relationship, Ear mentioned, alluding to the expectation that Cambodia shores up more Chinese investment and Belt and Road Initiative projects in the coming years.
“Given Trump’s limited focus on human rights issues and Cambodia’s established ties with China, Hun Manet may feel less pressure from the US to shift its alignment,” he said. “However, Hun Manet’s administration might also take subtle steps to diversify its partnerships within ASEAN and internationally to avoid over-reliance on China.”
“Cambodia is likely aware of the geopolitical risks associated with aligning too closely with one power, and Trump’s approach may afford them the flexibility to pursue a balanced policy without significant US pushback.”
While some analysts argue that US-Southeast Asia relations under Biden have prioritized realpolitik and alliance-building against China, leaving human rights on the back burner, Trump’s “America First” instincts and his appointment of Marco Rubio – co-author of nearly every congressional bill on Southeast Asia human rights – could bring a surprising twist to his typically transactional diplomacy.
Although, there is still a strong chance the two administrations keep it strictly pragmatic. But Trump’s looming mercantilist economic policies are seen as Cambodia’s biggest wildcard in the US transition.
(Additional reporting by Seoung Nimol)
